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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN WATSON CHEVROLET, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
BUICK MOTORS DIVISION, 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Appellant No. 20000351-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by assignment from the 
Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Whether the trial court erred in finding on Summary Judgment that no 
material fact was in dispute regarding the issue of equitable estoppel where the court 
found only that the defendant made no promise or took no other promissory action 
upon which the plaintiff could have reasonably relied to its detriment, damage or loss 
but failed to address issues of equitable estoppel wherein the reasonableness of the 
defendant's actions would be an issue for the finder of fact. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error; Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) 
B. Whether the trial court erred in finding on Summary Judgement that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the issues of interference with 
contractual relations or prospective economic advantage where the court found that the 
plaintiff had no vested right as to whether the defendant followed its internal policy 
and exercised its right of first refusal in its contract with Helsco even though Utah law 
prohibits a franchisor from unreasonably withholding its consent to any transfer of 
ownership and the issue of the reasonableness is a question for the trier of fact. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error; Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) 
C. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to state facts 
sufficient to support a claim for conspiracy where a finder of fact may conclude that the 
defendant's conduct in dealing with Helsco after the plaintiff already had a contract 
with Helsco for the sale of an automobile dealership constitutes civil conspiracy. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error; Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
Utah Code Annotated §13-14-3 (1979)*: 
Notwithstanding the terms of any new motor vehicle franchise, no 
franchisor shall terminate or refuse to continue any existing franchise 
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unless: 
(1) The franchisee has received written notice from the franchisor 
as follows: 
(b) fifteen days before the effective date thereof setting forth 
the specific grounds with respect to any of the following: 
(i) transfer of any ownership or interest in the franchise without 
the consent of the franchisor, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld; 
*Later amended in 1996 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: Plaintiff/Appellant is a Chevrolet automobile dealer in 
Ogden, Utah who applied with the defendant/appellee to become the Ogden Buick 
dealer after making arrangements to have a restraining order dismissed which 
prohibited sale of the Buick dealership. Plaintiff/Appellant was denied the dealership 
under General Motors Project 2000 plan even though Project 2000 had been waived for 
the previous applicant. General Motors then sought the local Pontiac dealer's 
application for the Buick dealership in violation of its own policy regarding the number 
of applications which can be considered. Appellant claims damages against the 
appellee in the amount of $7,500,000.00 general damages on each of four (4) causes of 
action and punitive damages. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: This matter was filed with 
the Second District Court in 1992. After significant discovery, the court heard and 
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granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order for Summary 
Judgment was entered on April 5, 2000 and appeal was filed by the plaintiff on April 19, 
2000. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
1. On February 10,1990, Helsco, Inc. dba Sierra Buick-Jeep-Eagle (hereinafter 
"Helsco" when referring to the corporation and "Sierra Buick" when referring to the 
function of the dealership) entered into a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement 
(hereinafter the "Dealer Agreement") with defendant/appellee, Buick Motor Division, 
General Motors Corporation, (hereinafter "defendant") for the operation of a Buick 
dealership in Ogden, Utah (Complaint paragraph 8). 
2. Among other things, the Dealer Agreement granted defendant a right of first 
refusal to purchase the dealership assets in the event Helsco submitted a proposal for 
change in ownership. The right of first refusal was granted to defendant "regardless of 
whether the proposed buyer is qualified to be a dealer" (Dealer Agreement paragraph 
12.3). The Dealer Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum " 1 . " 
3. Sierra Buick became an under performing dealership and in March and April 
of 1992 lost some of its key personnel. Helsco attempted to sell Sierra Buick to Rick 
Warner Enterprises, and entered into a Buy and Sell Agreement dated the 2nd day of 
April, 1992. (Record P. 003). Thereafter Sierra Buick failed to open during normal 
business hours, and finally closed its doors in May, 1992. 
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4. Rick Warner was approved as the Ogden Buick dealer by defendant and then 
later Ray Norda was approved as the dealer on behalf of Rick Warner Enterprises when 
Rick Warner was not able to personally meet the financing requirements. In order to 
approve Warner/Norda, defendant had to waive the Project 2000 alignment of 
dealerships. Buick did not exercise its right of first refusal under the Dealer Agreement. 
5. During the Warner-Sierra negotiations, John Watson expressed interest in 
filing an application for the Buick dealership at Ogden, Utah, and was advised by 
defendant's San Francisco office that they had a dealer in place and would not discuss 
the matter with any other applicant. (Watson Dep. P. 31-34; Garove Dep. P. 17-18; 
Woodley Dep. P. 64-66). Deposition pages and Memorandum are attached as 
addendum "2." 
6. Helsco had purchased the Buick dealership from James Whetton (hereinafter 
"Whetton"), who then obtained an injunction against Helsco prohibiting it from selling 
any of its assets on June 17,1992, and the Warner Buy and Sell Agreement was mutually 
rescinded on August 13,1992. (Record P. 004) 
7. Under the Dealer Agreement, defendant had a right to terminate Sierra Buick 
pursuant to a Notice of Termination and then purchase the Sierra Buick assets at 
appraised value, however, defendant could not enforce that portion of the Dealer 
Agreement because of the Whetton restraining order. Defendant then served Helsco 
with a sixty-day (60) notice dated August 19,1992, terminating their Buick franchise, 
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where no new Buick automobiles had been sold at Ogden, Utah for approximately five 
(5) months, although the zone manager claimed that he was unaware of the notice or 
the lack of sales. (Garove Dep. P. 34, 37) Deposition pages and Notice of Termination 
are attached as addendum "3 ." 
8. Plaintiff/Appellant, John Watson Chevrolet, Inc. (hereinafter " Watson" or 
"Plaintiff") then negotiated a Buy and Sell Agreement with Helsco dated the 31st day of 
August, 1992. (Record P. 004). Helsco was faced with selling to Watson or filing 
bankruptcy because they had been served with the termination notice by defendant. 
The Buy and Sell Agreement is attached as addendum "4." 
9. As a condition precedent to the execution of the Buy and Sell Agreement 
between Helsco and Watson, Watson would use his influence with Whetton to get the 
temporary injunction against sale of Sierra assets dismissed. While defendant claims it 
was not aware of Watson's ability and agreement to get the TRO dismissed, both Koch 
and Mixon claim to have given defendant notice. Watson fulfilled his obligation and on 
August 24,1992, the Whetton TRO was dismissed. Defendant then sent an application 
to Watson and he applied to defendant to become the Buick dealer in Ogden, Utah on 
September 2,1992. (Koch Dep. P. 19-20, Watson Dep. P. 54, Mixon Dep. P. 52, 67-69) 
Deposition pages are attached as addendum "5." 
10. John Watson is qualified to be a Buick dealer and had previously been the 
Buick dealer at Rock Springs and Evanston, Wyoming and during the pendency of this 
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action, he was appointed the Buick dealer at Logan, Utah. 
11. During the time that the Watson application was pending and unknown to 
Watson, defendant negotiated with Henry Mixon of Helsco agreeing not to execute 
defendant's Notice of Termination in exchange for which Mixon agreed not to bankrupt 
Helsco. Defendant feared that if Helsco filed bankruptcy the purchaser in the 
bankruptcy court might be an " unsatisfactory" dealer. (Business Case document from 
the San Francisco Zone to defendant in Detroit. Document attached as addendum "6." 
12. It has been a long standing policy of General Motors Corporation and a 
standard within the industry that when an application for a Dealer Sales and Service 
Agreement accompanied by a Buy and Sell Agreement has been received, no other 
application will be entertained, and Buick Motor Division will not discuss the 
qualifications of any other applicant until it has notified the selling dealer that the 
application under consideration and the Buy and Sell Agreement has been rejected. See 
addendum 2. 
13. At least nine (9) days prior to October 15,1992, the date of defendant's 
rejection letter on the Watson application, defendant, through its Pontiac Division, 
initiated contact with other prospective applicants to see if they were interested in the 
Buick dealership in Ogden, Utah, among whom was Kent Petersen, who was recruited 
by Buick's San Francisco zone manager, Tom Garove before the 6th day of October, 1992. 
(Garove Dep. P. 91-92; Petersen Dep. P. 13) Deposition pages are attached as addendum 
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"7." See also addendum 6. 
14. David Koch was the dealer/operator of the Sierra Buick dealership and no 
representative of General Motors talked to David Koch to get permission to talk to 
other dealers as alleged by Mr. Garove. Instead, Garove claims to have obtained 
permission from Henry Mixon who was the majority stockholder in Helsco although 
Mixon claims no recollection of the conversation. (Garove Dep. P. 85-92 and 101; Koch 
Dep. P. 22-23; Mixon Dep. P. 84) Deposition pages are attached as addendum "8." 
15. Defendant had in its possession a copy of Buy and Sell Agreement between 
Sierra and Watson and knew that Sierra had contracted to do everything in its power to 
see that John Watson was appointed as the Buick dealer at Ogden, Utah. Defendant 
solicited Kent Petersen's application by asking him to accept the terms and conditions 
of the Watson-Sierra Buy and Sell Agreement while it was still a valid agreement 
between Watson and Helsco. Defendant accepted Kent Peterson application to be the 
Ogden dealer on October 13,1992. See addendum "7." 
16. The only reason given by Mr. Garove to Kent Petersen for the rejection of the 
Watson application and the exercise of a right of first refusal by defendant was the 
Project 2000 Alignment promulgated by General Motors Corporation for the Ogden 
area putting Buick, Pontiac and GMC trucks together in one dealership even though it 
had been waived for Rick Warner. See addendum "7." 
17. Jim Whetton was attempting to regain the Buick dealership at Ogden, Utah 
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and defendant claimed that it was concerned that if John Watson was the appointed 
Buick dealer, Jim Whetton would have some ownership interest (Koch Dep. P. 20-21) 
though the Watson-Sierra Buy and Sell Agreement contains provisions preventing the 
involvement of Whetton. Deposition pages attached as addendum "9." 
18. Though Kent Petersen was aware that Sierra Buick was for sale, he did not 
attempt to negotiate a purchase even after he knew that the Warner purchase had fallen 
through and knew that the purchase by any other dealer was contrary to Project 2000. 
Kent Peterson assumed that John Watson would be appointed the Buick dealer in 
Ogden, Utah and did not make application for the Buick dealership until he was 
approached by defendant's Pontiac Division. (Peterson Dep. P. 11-12) Deposition pages 
are attached as addendum "10." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant presumes that its right of first refusal takes precedence over the Utah 
Statute that prohibits a franchisor from unreasonably withholding its consent to appoint 
the dealer of choice of its franchisee. The defendant's own Business Case identifies its 
three (3) alternatives: (1) appoint John Watson who had a Buy-Sell Contract with the 
existing dealer; (2) risk that Helsco will file bankruptcy and an " unsatisfactory" dealer 
will bid in the bankruptcy court; or, (3) use Project 2000. Defendant chose to use its 
Project 2000 alignment policy which had not previously been exercised in the Zone and 
had been waived for the prior applicant as a means to manipulate the dealer 
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appointment and in doing so unreasonably refused John Watson's application. The 
determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's withholding of its consent is a 
question for the jury. Defendant then had to exercise improper means in order to use 
Project 2000, interfering with the Watson-Sierra Buy-Sell Agreement and contacting 
Kent Peterson while the John Watson application was pending in violation of its own 
policy. A jury may also determine improper purpose when the totality of the facts of 
defendant's convenient waivers and conduct are presented. 
A jury could reasonably determine that plaintiff should be compensated for his 
loss through the doctrine of equitable estoppel where defendant, through its conduct of 
previous waivers and failure to exercise its right of first refusal, by its silence led 
plaintiff to a course of conduct which included arranging for the dismissal of the 
Temporary Restraining Order believing that he could then purchase the Buick 
dealership. In so doing, the door was left open for defendant to then broker the Sierra 
Buick dealership in one hand while accepting plaintiff's dealer application with the 
other. 
Defendant was part of a civil conspiracy with Henry Mixon when together they 
arranged for the delay of the Termination Notice sixty-day (60) deadline in exchange for 
a promise from Mixon not to take Helsco into bankruptcy in order to have more time to 
work out a Buy-Sell Agreement with Kent Peterson. Defendant unlawfully violated the 
statute by withholding its consent for John Watson to become the dealer in order to 
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further their plan. It is a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant 
states a sufficient business purpose in its conduct or has committed an unlawful act to 
the detriment of the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
CONDUCT IN INTERFERING WITH THE BUY-SELL 
AGREEMENT AND REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S DEALER 
APPLICATION IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE 
JURY. 
Although the defendant had a right of first refusal contractually with Sierra 
Buick-Jeep-Eagle to purchase the assets of the dealership under Section 12.3.2 of the 
Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (See attached addendum 1), defendant gave no 
notice of their intent to do so. Defendant had the opportunity to give notice of its intent 
to exercise its right of first refusal before approving Warner /Nor da as a dealer, after the 
recission of the Warner/Norda contract on August 13,1992 and at the time that they 
served the Notice of Termination of the dealership on Sierra on August 19,1992. In 
addition, defendant could have actually exercised its right of first refusal after the 
Whetton Temporary Restraining Order was dismissed on August 24,1992 and prior to 
the Watson-Sierra Buy Sell Agreement execution on August 31,1992. Instead, 
defendant sent an application for the dealership to John Watson and accepted his 
application on September 2,1992. 
John Watson had been the Buick dealer in both Evanston and Rock Springs, 
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Wyoming and since the commencement of this action has been appointed the Buick 
dealer in Logan, Utah and was qualified to be appointed the Buick dealer at Ogden, 
Utah. 
Utah Code Annotated §13-14-3 (1979) provides in part: 
Notwithstanding the terms of any new motor vehicle franchise, no 
franchisor shall terminate or refuse to continue any existing franchi.se 
unless: 
(1) The franchisee has received written notice from the franchisor 
as follows: 
(b) fifteen days before the effective date thereof setting forth 
the specific grounds with respect to any of the following: 
(i) transfer of any ownership or interest in the franchise without 
the consent of the franchisor, which consent shall not be 
unreasonably withheld; (emphasis added) 
The Western District of Pennsylvania in Crivelli et al vs. General Motors 
Corporation, 40 F. Supp.2d 639 (W.D. Perm), relied on the similar language in the 
Pennsylvania code in determining that General Motors' contractual right of first refusal 
was subject to the reasonableness language in the statute as follows: 
(b) Violations. It shall be a violation of this Act for any manufacturer, 
factory branch, distributor, field representative, officer, agent or any 
representative whatsoever of such manufacturer, factory branch or 
distributor licenced under this Act to: 
(3) Unreasonably withhold consent to the sale, transfer or exchange of the 
franchise to a qualified buyer capable of being licensed as a new 
vehicle dealer in this commonwealth who meets the manufacturer's 
or distributor's reasonable requirements for appointment as a 
dealer. (Emphasis added) 
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63 P.S. §818.12 
General Motors also made a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Crivelli 
matter which was denied by the court on the ground that the issue of whether the 
consent was unreasonably withheld was an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. In 
its Memorandum Decision the Pennsylvania court stated: 
On February 6th defendant exercised its right of refusal and 
notified plaintiffs of its action. GM contends that this 
amounted to nothing more than an exercise of its 
"considered business judgment" in selecting franchisees for 
its dealerships, and therefore was not unreasonable. . . We 
have considered In Re Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13 F.3rd 
674 (3d Cir. 1993) where the Court of Appeals found that an 
issue of material fact arose in a similar situation. . . The 
Court found that a finder of fact would have to determine 
whether the denial of approval was unreasonable. Applying 
that teaching we find that plaintiffs have adduced sufficient 
evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact. 
Plaintiff's claims will survive summary judgment. 
A copy of the decision on summary judgment is attached hereto as addendum "11." 
In the instant case, the circumstance for the trier of fact to determine the 
reasonableness of the defendant's refusal to appoint John Watson as the Ogden, Utah 
Buick dealer include Watson's qualifications as a dealer, Watson's ability to do what no 
one else had accomplished, (including defendant) in arranging for the dismissal of the 
Whetton Temporary Restraining Order, and whether the Project 2000 alignment was 
appropriately applied. Project 2000 was a variable internal policy being constantly 
revised by defendant at its convenience to promote the very type of contract 
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interference that occurred to Watson where the purchasing dealer, though meeting all 
of the General Motors dealer criteria, is not the candidate that has the inside track with 
the division: witness the selection of Warner over Peterson (defendant failed to contact 
Peterson when Warner was selected as the dealer even though Peterson met the Project 
2000 criteria) and the selection of Peterson over Watson. A trier of fact could reasonably 
determine that where Project 2000 was waived for the Warner/Nor da contract, it was 
unfairly and improperly applied to the Watson contract. 
This selection process by defendant is best illustrated by the defendant's own 
Business Case which was the Zone's recommendation to Buick Division in Flint, 
Michigan sent October 7,1992(see attached addendum 6). The Zone identified three (3) 
alternatives for appointment of a dealer/operator in Ogden, Utah. First, defendant 
could exercise its right of first refusal, citing Project 2000, which would require the 
appointment of Kent Peterson as the Buick dealer/operator; secondly, if defendant did 
not use its right of first refusal Helsco would file bankruptcy and defendant might be 
forced to accept an "unsatisfactory" dealer purchasing out of the bankruptcy court as 
occurred in Crivelli; the third alternative was to, once again, waive Project 2000 and 
appoint John Watson as the Buick dealer. The recommendation of the Business Case 
was to select the Project 2000 alignment soliciting Kent Peterson's cooperation. 
In order to submit the Business Case and perpetuate defendant's method of 
dealer selection by using Project 2000, defendant had to violate its standard policy of 
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considering only one application at a time as explained by the Buick Zone Manager, 
Tom Garove in his deposition and in John Watson's deposition in the attached 
addendum "2." By employing the Project 2000 control, defendant had no alternative 
but to solicit Kent Peterson. Defendant had to assure that Kent Peterson would be 
willing to make application for the dealership, that he was at least as qualified as John 
Watson, that he had the financial backing and that he was willing to match the terms of 
the already existing Watson-Sierra Buy-Sell Agreement. Had Kent Peterson not 
qualified or been unable to meet the Watson-Sierra Buy-Sell terms, it is logical that 
defendant would have waived Project 2000 regardless of the applicant. 
There is sufficient evidence to support a jury determination that Project 2000 
implementation through the right of first refusal was an improper means to accomplish 
an improper purpose because it permitted the defendant to engineer any Buy and Sell 
Agreement and, in this case, reject the Watson application contrary to the Utah statute. 
This concept is further illustrated by a note to the Zone file, handwritten by Tom 
Garove wherein, Garove identifies three (3) similar alternatives in what appears to be a 
draft of the Business Case. However, Garove's handwritten version does not identify 
use of the Project 2000 pretense, instead, Garove states, "Turn down based on sales 
effectiveness and lack of performance/' See addendum "12." The right of first refusal 
was used, not to reject an unqualified dealer, but to manipulate the selection process as 
explained by Garove in his deposition pages 86-89 which are included in addendum 8 
15 
and contrary to the Utah statutory requirement of reasonableness. 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Aurora Air Service, 604 P.2d 1090 (Ala. 1979), the 
Alaska Supreme Court said 
We reject Alyeska's contention that a privilege arising from a 
contractual right is absolute and may be exercised regardless 
of motive. It is a recognized principal that a party to a 
contract has a right of action against a third party who has 
intentionally procured the breach of that contract by the 
other party without justification or privilege. 
Id. at 1093. The Alaska Supreme Court went on to state 
The question of justification for invading the contractual 
interest of another is normally one for the trier of fact, 
particularly when the evidence is in conflict. In the case at 
bar, the central factual issue, as to which there was 
evidentiary conflict was whether Alyeska was genuinely 
furthering it own economic and safety interests or was using 
them as a facade for inflicting injury upon Aurora. There 
was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could properly 
find that Alyeska was acting out of ill will towards Aurora, 
rather than to protect a legitimate business interest. The trial 
judge correctly denied Alyeska's motion for summary 
judgment and submitted this issue to the jury. (Citations 
and footnotes omitted.) 
Id. at 1094. 
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. vs. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the Court 
recognized that individual improper acts may not by themselves constitute improper 
means but the cumulative effect of those acts may be "improper means/ ' The Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Leigh: 
Neither a deliberate breach of contract nor an immediate 
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purpose to inflict injury which does not predominate over a 
legitimate economic end will by itself satisfy this element of 
the tort. However, they may do so in combination. This is 
so because contract damages provide an insufficient remedy 
for a breach prompted by an immediate purpose to injure, 
and that purpose does not enjoy the same legal immunity in 
the context of contract relations as it does in the competitive 
market place. 
Id. at 309. Thus, even though defendant argues a legitimate economic end in 
implementing Project 2000 that predominates any other consideration, Alyeska and 
Leigh Furniture clearly teach that defendant's claimed legitimate economic end cannot 
be obtained by using an improper means or improper purpose or both. See also Pratt 
vs. Prodata, Inc. 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994); St. Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hos., 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
Further, Leigh Furniture confirms that the plaintiff is not required to negate 
defendant's claims of privilege to interfere with the contract between Watson and 
Helsco because of defendant's right of first refusal in its contract with Helsco. The 
privilege is an affirmative defense requiring the defendant to present evidence that will 
convince the trier of fact. Id at 302-3. 
Finally, it is a question for the jury to determine whether the defendant 
employed improper means and /o r improper purpose and whether defendant's conduct 
constitutes an inappropriate interference with the plaintiff's contract with Helsco. The 
jury may conclude improper purpose based on any of the following: 
1. Project 2000 was waived for Warner/Nor da and Warner was approved 
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by defendant to dual the Buick-Jeep-Eagle dealership with Mitsubishi and was 
later approved to dual Buick with Chrysler-Plymouth but defendant used 
Project 2000 to reject Watson's application believing he would dual Buick with 
his already existing General Motors Chevrolet dealership and eventually comply 
with the Project 2000 requirements. See addendum "13" handwritten and typed 
version of the Mitsubishi dual and handwritten Note to File by Garove for 
approval of Chrysler dual. 
2. Only John Watson could get the Whetton Temporary Restraining Order 
released. See addendum "5." 
3. After defendant admitted that the rejection of the Watson application 
was not related to his prior performance as a Buick dealer, defendant accused 
Watson of being an underperforming dealer in Rock Springs and Evanston, 
Wyoming. Defendant then solicited Kent Peterson as the Buick dealer even 
though he was currently an underperforming Pontiac-GMC dealer. See 
addendum "14." 
4. Helsco had contractually agreed in the Buy and Sell Agreement with 
Watson to use its best efforts to assist Watson in obtaining consent and approval 
from General Motors to become the dealer. Defendant then did an end-run 
around David Koch, who was the Sierra dealer/operator, and claims to have 
talked to Henry Mixon, a stockholder in Helsco, to obtain permission to contact 
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Kent Peterson. Mixon claims that he does not recall the conversation and had 
previously written a letter to the Zone Manager stating that he was not even an 
officer of Helsco. See addenda 4 and 8 and addendum "15." 
5. Defendant approached Henry Mixon and offered to extend the sixty-
day (60) time limit on the termination of the dealership so that a Buy-Sell 
Agreement could be reached with Kent Peterson if Mixon would agree that 
Helsco would not file bankruptcy in order to avoid an "unsatisfactory dealer" 
from the bankruptcy court. See addendum "6" and "16." 
In addressing the principle of improper means the Utah Supreme Court in St. 
Benedicts Dev. v. St. Benedicts Hos., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) expounded upon the 
Leigh Furniture case confirming that "Means may also be improper or wrongful 
because they violate 'an established standard of a trade or profession.'" Id. at 201 
(Citation omitted). Similarly, in Big Apple BMW, Inc. vs. BMW of North America, 974 
F. 2d 1358, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that "factual underpinnings of the 
tort claims are intertwined" with the plaintiffs statutory claims, and a finder of fact 
would need to determine whether the actions constituted improper interference. Id. at 
1382. See addendum "17." See also 9 ALR2d 228 and 5 ALR4th 9. 
Defendant argues that they are entitled to summary judgment because their right 
of first refusal trumps the Utah statute and all other conduct in this matter. The trial 
court bought defendant's argument as the basis for granting summary judgment. The 
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same argument was presented and rejected in Crivelli 
There is no merit to GM's argument that the contractual 
right of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement trumps the 
statutory mandate that a manufacturer cannot unreasonably 
withhold its consent to a qualified buyer. The Court of 
appeals has held that a fact finder must resolve the question 
whether General Motors acted unreasonably and in bad faith 
in violation of the New Jersey Franchise Act when it rejected 
a purchaser's application to become a dealer. In re 
Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13 F.3d 674 (3rd Cir. 1993). There, 
as here, General Motors possessed a contractual right of first 
refusal. 
Crivelli, Order on Motion. 
Like, Crivelli, the State of Utah has a statute designed to set out public policy for 
the protection of its citizens and businesses that prohibits defendant from unreasonably 
withholding its consent to the appointment of the franchisee's choice of dealers when a 
contract exists between the franchisee and the proposed dealer. The determination of 
whether defendant acted reasonably is a question for the jury. Further, whether 
defendant's conduct constituted an improper purpose or used improper means are 
questions exclusively for the jury. 
II. ESTOPPEL MAY OCCUR BY ACT AND DEED, 
RATHER THAN VERBAL OR WRITTEN 
REPRESENTATION. 
In United American Life Ins. Co. v. Zion's First National Bank, 
641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court defined equitable estoppel as 
"conduct by one party which leads another party in reliance thereon, to adopt a course 
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of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his 
conduct/' Id. at 161. In an earlier case, Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1976) the Utah Supreme Court defined conduct by stating 
Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss 
a party who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of 
action by the wrong or neglect of another. The measure we 
apply to plaintiffs' claim of estoppel is an adaptation to this 
case of the standard heretofore approved by this court: 
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant Board) by his acts, 
representations, or admissions or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, intentionally or through culpable negligence, 
induces another (plaintiffs) to believe certain facts to exist 
and that such other (plaintiffs) acting with reasonable 
prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon so that he 
will suffer an injustice if the former (Land Board) is 
permitted to deny the existence of such facts, (citations 
omitted) 
Morgan, at 697. 
The following facts are undisputed: 
1. Defendant was, or soon after became aware that Sierra had 
closed its doors and few, if any, Buick automobiles were being sold in 
Ogden, Utah after March 1,1992. See Tim Martin memo to Buick San 
Francisco Zone Office dated May 6,1992 and Woodley memo dated June 
30,1992 attached as addendum "18." 
2. To approve the Warner/Nor da application defendant had to 
waive their Project 2000 requirement and make no contact with Kent 
Peterson, the existing Pontiac-GMC dealer. 
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3. Defendant did not exercise its right of first refusal prior to the 
Warner/Nor da deal, after the Warner/Nor da contract was rescinded or 
the equivalent right to purchase assets at market value after the Whetton 
TRO was dismissed or prior to the Watson Buy-Sell Agreement and 
application. See addendum 1 paragraph 12.3.2(b). 
4. Defendant was aware that John Watson was interested in the 
purchase of the Sierra assets and becoming the Ogden Buick dealer prior 
to the approval of the Warner/Nor da contract. Watson was told at that 
time that defendant would consider only one (1) dealer application at a 
time. See addendum 2. 
5. Defendant was also aware that John Watson could get the 
Whetton TRO dismissed before Watson and Helsco entered into their Buy 
and Sell Agreement. Koch deposition pages 19-20 in addendum 5. 
6. After receiving the Watson-Sierra Buy-Sell Agreement defendant 
forwarded a dealer application to John Watson and on or about 
September 29,1992 defendant inspected Watson's facilities which was the 
building where Mercedes had previously been housed adjacent to the 
Chevrolet showroom on Wall Ave. The Zone Manager, upon his 
inspection, stated to Watson that he did not want the Buick franchise in 
"that maze of franchises out on River dale Road/7 where Kent Peterson's 
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dealerships are located. See Watson Dep. P. 64 and Garove Dep. P. 61 
attached as addendum "19." 
7. By sending its Notice of Termination to Helsco on August 19, 
1992, defendant had to know that they would be purchasing the Sierra 
assets under Section 12.3.2(b) of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement 
because no Buy-Sell Agreement existed at that time, however, the 
Whetton TRO was still in place prohibiting the transfer of any Sierra 
assets. In his deposition the Zone Manager denied a Notice of 
Termination was sent but the letter bears his signature. See addenda 1 
and 3. 
8. But for the Watson-Helsco Buy-Sell Agreement, Helsco was 
going to be forced into bankruptcy because of the Notice of Termination. 
Later, while the Watson application was pending, defendant promised 
Helsco that the sixty-day (60) termination would be extended in order to 
enter into a Buy-Sell Agreement with Kent Peterson if Helsco would agree 
not to file bankruptcy. See addendum 16. 
The Restatement of Contracts, 2nd Sec. 59, Comment a, states: 
An assertion may also be inferred from conduct other than words. 
Concealment or even non-disclosure may have the effect of a 
misrepresentation under the rules stated in Sections 160 and 161, whether 
a misrepresentation is fraudulent is determined by the rules stated in 
Section 162(1). However, an assertion need not be fraudulent to be a 
misrepresentation. . .whether an assertion is material is determined by the 
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rules stated in Section 162(2). 
Restatement of Contract, 2nd Sec. 161: 
A person's nondisclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an 
assertion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only 
(b) Where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct 
a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on 
which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure 
of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in 
accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. 
(c) Where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct 
a mistake of the other party as to the contents or effect of a 
writing, evidencing or embodying an agreement in whole or 
in part. 
Comment a: Concealment Distinguished. 
Like concealment, non-disclosure of a fact may be equivalent 
to a misrepresentation. 
Defendant needed the Whetton TRO dismissed in order to even exercise its right 
of first refusal and sell any Buick automobiles in Ogden, Utah. Defendant also wanted 
to assure that Helsco would not file bankruptcy and allow for an " unsatisfactory 
dealer" to bid for the Sierra assets in the bankruptcy court. Defendant knew that other 
applicants for the Sierra Buick dealership would believe that their application would be 
treated exactly the same as the Warner/Norda application, i.e. defendant would not 
exercise its right of first refusal and Project 2000 would be waived, and defendant did 
nothing that would indicate otherwise to plaintiff, happily accepting that plaintiff could 
get the TRO dismissed. See addendum 5. To the plaintiffs face, the defendant 
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proceeded to process the plaintiffs application for the dealership. At the same time, 
defendant was negotiating with Helsco and with another dealer to obtain commitments 
that would permit defendant to select a favored dealer all behind plaintiffs back. 
III. DEFENDANT ENGAGED IN CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
IN ACTING AS A BROKER FOR THE TRANSFER OF 
THE DEALERSHIP TO A BUYER WHO HAD NO 
CONTRACT TO PURCHASE FROM SIERRA. 
In Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court 
of Appeals defined the elements of civil conspiracy as 
(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be 
accomplished (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or 
course of action, (4) one or more unlawful overt acts, and (5) 
damages as a proximate result thereof. . . Plaintiff must 
present clear and convincing evidence to carry his burden of 
proof on a charge of civil conspiracy.(citations omitted). 
Id. at 791. The Court went on to state 
[I]t is not necessary in a civil conspiracy action to prove that 
the parties actually came together and entered into a formal 
agreement to do the acts complained of by direct 
evidence...instead, conspiracy may be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence, including the nature of the act done, 
the relations of the parties, and the interests of the alleged 
conspirators. 
Id. at 791. 
Plaintiff asserts that the parties involved in the conspiracy were defendant and 
Henry Mixon, who was the principle investor in Helsco but was not an officer of the 
corporation nor the appointed dealer. The object to be accomplished was the transfer of 
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the Helsco assets. Defendant needed to sell Buicks in Ogden, Utah and Henry Mixon 
(hereinafter "Mixon") needed to stop his financial hemorrhaging and recoup whatever 
funds possible. 
Plaintiff need not show a formal agreement between defendant and Mixon. The 
objective evidence demonstrates that defendant had a clearly delineated standing policy 
of considering only one dealer application at a time. See addendum 2. Contrary to the 
identified policy, Tom Garove, the Zone Manager, ignored the dealer/operator 
designated in paragraph third (3rd) of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (Koch) 
and represents that he contacted Mixon to obtain permission to solicit Kent Peterson's 
application even though Helsco was under an affirmative obligation to do everything in 
its power to assure that Watson would be appointed as the Buick dealer by defendant. 
Mixon stated that he had no recollection of the contact. See addenda 1 and 8. 
Nonetheless, Kent Peterson was contacted and at the urging of the defendant, Peterson 
agreed to accept the terms of the Watson-Sierra Buy-Sell Agreement while the Watson 
application was pending. 
Defendant and Mixon further pursued their course of conduct agreeing to delay 
their individual rights of action in order to create enough time to establish the Peterson 
Buy-Sell Agreement. Defendant agreed to extend the time deadline on its Notice of 
Termination. Mixon agreed not to take Helsco into bankruptcy. See addendum 19. In 
conjunction with the defendant's conduct, Mixon was also in violation of the Watson 
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Buy-Sell Agreement paragraph 4d committing the seller, Helsco, to use its best efforts to 
obtain the approval of defendant for Watson to be appointed as the new Buick dealer. 
See addendum 4. Defendant accepted Peterson's application dated October 13,1992. 
Defendant rejected Watson's application on October 15,1992. Defendant stated to 
Peterson and identified in its Business Case that the reason for the denial for the Watson 
application was the nebulous and ever changing Project 2000 alignment which had 
never before been used as a criteria for transfer of dealerships in the zone. See 
addendum 6 and 7 and Woodley Dep. P. 69-71 attached as addendum "20." 
Defendant argues that it did nothing unlawful because it had a contract right of 
first refusal and therefore there is no civil conspiracy. However, in discussing the 
"improper means" prong the Utah Supreme Court also identified at least a partial list of 
unlawful acts in the Leigh Furniture case 
The alternative requirement to improper means is satisfied 
where the means used to interfere with the party's economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, 
regulations, or recognized common-law rules. Such acts are 
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 
"improper" means of interference, unless those means 
consist of constitutionally protected activity , like the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. . . Means may also be 
improper or wrongful because they violate "an established 
standard of the industry." (Citations omitted). 
Leigh Furniture, 293 P.2d at 308. Civil conspiracy does not require a criminal act, only a 
"unlawful" overt act. Defendant was unlawful in its violation of the terms of Utah 
Code Ann. §13-14-3 by unreasonably withholding its consent for John Watson to 
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become the Ogden Buick dealer. Defendant attempts to argue that its right of first 
refusal overrides the statute and that it chose to exercise its right of first refusal 
apparently for purposes of the Project 2000 alignment even though it had waived 
Project 2000 for the previous applicant. In order to use Project 2000 to attempt to avoid 
a statutory violation, defendant also interfered with the Plaintiff Buy and Sell 
Agreement with Sierra by dealing with Henry Mixon to arrange for more time to set up 
the sale to Kent Peterson, the only dealer who could comply with Project 2000, using the 
terms of the Plaintiffs own Buy and Sell Agreement. Defendant had to violate its own 
policy and a standard of the industry to contact Kent Peterson while the Watson 
application was pending. 
Plaintiff performed on his portion of the contract to date of the rejection of his 
application by defendant. Plaintiff made the requested deposit of a substantial part of 
the purchase price of the Helsco assets in escrow pending his appointment as the Buick 
dealer. After defendant exercised its right of first refusal, that money was returned to 
plaintiff but plaintiff's damages for defendant's conduct are substantial even if by the 
nature of the circumstances they are somewhat uncertain. In Atkin, Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held 
The evidence must do more than merely give rise to 
speculation that damages in fact occurred; it must give rise 
to a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage 
as a result of a breach. Second, the plaintiff must prove the 
amount of damages. The level of persuasiveness required to 
establish the fact of loss is generally higher than that 
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required to show the amount of loss. It is, after all, the 
wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should bear 
the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 336. See also Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d 
802 (Utah 1957). Logic dictates that the Ogden Buick dealership could have been 
profitable for John Watson and has, in fact, been profitable for Kent Peterson. While 
John Watson must and can show the jury that there is a reasonable probability of loss to 
him, it should be up to the jury to determine the amount. 
In Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc, Inc., 363 P.2d 402 (Utah 1963) a 
milk delivery driver sued Federated when they encouraged all of their milk producers 
to switch to the tank method of delivery. The court determined that the trial court was 
in error for granting summary judgment when it was a question for the jury to 
determine whether the interference in the contract was based on illegal price fixing or a 
legitimate business change. Similarly, the jury in this matter should hear and make the 
determination as to whether the defendant unlawfully withheld its consent under the 
statute or if the statute is subservient to the contractual right of first refusal. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant cannot be allowed to use its right of first refusal and Project 2000, a 
nebulous and ever changing alignment policy never implemented in the Zone prior to 
rejecting plaintiffs application, to control buy and sell agreements and manipulate the 
appointment of dealers. Logically, Utah Code Ann. §13-14-3 was enacted to deter just 
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such conduct. The Project 2000 policy is ignored if the purchaser is in favor with the 
zone management as was Warner Enterprises in this matter, but implemented for 
unstated reasons against John Watson even though Watson was a qualified Buick dealer 
and had agreed to conform to the Project 2000 alignment, agreed not to dual Chevrolet 
and Buick, agreed to construct a new, separate showroom, and agreed to meet all other 
conditions imposed by the zone as set forth in their case. 
In order to implement Project 2000, defendant had to violate it's own policy to 
solicit Kent Peterson's cooperation to apply for the dealership which he had not done in 
competition to Warner/Norda or John Watson until asked to do so by defendant while 
Watson's application was still pending. Peterson was also required to accept the basic 
terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement between Watson and Helso even though that 
agreement was still valid. In order to have time to develop a Peterson Buy-Sell 
Agreement, defendant had to conspire with Henry Mixon to delay a Helsco bankruptcy 
and the sixty-day (60) Termination Notice consequences. The exercise of the right of 
first refusal under the guise of Project 2000 was not in good faith and violated the 
"improper purpose" prong of Leigh Furniture, and the solicitation of Petersen Motor 
violated the "improper means" prong of Leigh Furniture. 
Questions of reasonableness of the defendant's rejection of John Watson's 
application, improper purpose/improper means, conduct sufficient to rise to the level 
of equitable estoppel and civil conspiracy are all questions of fact for the jury. 
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Defendant must not be allowed to have such total control over the selection of dealers 
by camouflaging its conduct under the guise of "legitimate business interests'7 which is 
only a vapor arising from the cauldron of ever-changing internal policies selectively 
enforced in an adhesion contract provision of a right of first refusal. 
Respectfully submitted this / $ day of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ , 2000. 
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